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ABSTRACT
Against the backdrop of the growing leverage that MENA states have been acquiring vis-à-vis 
Europe on the issue of migration and border controls over the last decade, this paper identifies 
a number of trends in the responses of MENA states on these issues. By providing examples 
from the western Mediterranean, especially North African countries, it focuses on two interrelated 
aspects: First, it highlights the tendency to “localize” international norms and practices in the 
realm of migration management, that is, to adapt and modify these norms according to domestic 
preferences and conditions. Second, we discuss the ever-growing trend to criminalize migration 
and the ever-diminishing attention paid to human rights. The paper concludes by pointing to the 
growing embeddedness of the region in the international governance of migration, but with a 
twist: MENA governments are “embedded” in the broader trend of criminalizing migration and 
reinforcing state control, to the general detriment of human rights standards.
INTRODUCTION
With the substantive growth of migration from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region to 
Europe after the Arab uprisings, the issues of refugees, migration and border controls have moved 
to the top of the agenda of European policy-makers (and publics), as well as of the international 
community at large (Rózsa 2017). A number of studies have highlighted the leverage, or the 
potential leverage, that MENA states have been acquiring vis-à-vis European states on the issue of 
migration over the last decade (e.g. Cassarino 2007, Del Sarto 2010, Paoletti 2011, El Qadim 2015). 
Considering the high degree of interdependence between the two sides, the leverage held by MENA 
countries mainly results from Europe’s attempts to co-opt MENA governments in the management 
of migration flows to Europe and thus to “socialize” MENA states. After the Arab uprisings, Europe’s 
incapacity or inability to manage the influx of refugees and migrants internally, together with the 
threat and urgency ascribed to the “migration crisis” in Europe, only added to the power of MENA 
states to impose conditions on Europe (Cassarino 2014, Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani 2016).
Against this backdrop, this paper identifies a number of trends in the responses of MENA states 
to the issues of migration and border controls, particularly vis-à-vis Europe, by focusing on 
two interrelated aspects. First, it highlights the rather usual approach of states to “localize” 
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international norms and practices in the realm of migration management, that is, to adapt and 
modify these norms according to domestic preferences and conditions. Examples are provided 
here from the western Mediterranean, especially North African countries. Second, we discuss the 
ever-growing tendency to criminalize migration and the ever-diminishing attention paid to human 
rights that have characterized the international governance of migration in recent years. In the 
light of these major trends, the paper concludes by assessing the embeddedness of the region in 
the international governance of migration.
1. LOCALIZING NORMS
The socialization of non-Western countries has often been sought by the Western community 
in order to claim the universalism and “effectiveness” of liberal values (Goodman and Jinks 
2004). There is a growing literature which sets out to uncover the rationale behind this claim 
as well as the mechanisms aimed at exporting rules and practices in various regional settings 
(Epstein 2014, Cebeci 2016, Del Sarto 2016, Epstein 2017). The main contribution of this very 
diverse body of literature is to draw attention to the fact that there is no stable point from which to 
observe international systems and analyse socialization, because we are dealing with dynamics 
of communication and multiple meanings for the actors involved. Various scholars have thus 
examined the ways in which socialization has been biased towards a predominantly Western 
structure-oriented approach (Jabri 2013), which discards the identity and the agency of those who 
are meant to be socialized (Epstein 2012: 136). This biased approach also dismisses the voices 
of the socializees, treating them as “resistant” or “defective” (Cebeci 2016: 180). Epstein rightly 
remarks that, once the socialization process takes place, change in the “adopter population” 
(Checkel 1999: 86) is simply depoliticized by conventional constructivist scholarship. Rejection of 
certain norms by the socializee is all too often “infantilized” (Epstein 2012: 141) or dismissed as 
a form of unmotivated “resistance” or defection. However, it may well result from a domestically 
localized (Acharya 2004) and historically specific set of values that policy-makers should consider.
In other words, not only do socializees have a clear vision about what they want to attain through 
cooperation, they also turn out to be active borrowers able to reshape the reception of global 
norms. Here, the notion of congruence introduced by Acharya (2004: 245–6) when dealing 
with norm localization is of paramount importance to realize that transferred norms may be 
readapted to local conditions. Localization makes “an outside norm congruent with a pre-existing 
local normative order” (Acharya 2004: 244). This process thus is not necessarily a response to 
demands for new norms imposed from the outside. Rather, it is a proactive strategy aimed at 
accommodating foreign norms and ideas to local sensitivities. Under certain conditions, local 
norms and administrative traditions are strong enough to ensure the selective reception of global 
norms, with a view to limiting their domestic social and political costs. Local norms and traditions 
may also be sufficiently robust to integrate the global norms into existing local systems, with a 
view to buttressing their authority and command.
It is important to realize that the agency of socializees and their “cognitive priors” have usually been 
“ignored or assumed away with simplifying assumptions” (Checkel 1999: 86), and a growing body of 
literature has started to pay attention to these flaws (Cassarino forthcoming, Del Sarto and Tholens 
forthcoming). Indeed, despite their permeability to external influences, non-Western countries 
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have never been passive recipients. Nor can their varied capacity for “local” readjustment when 
faced with external pressures from their foreign “partners” be dismissed. Norm localization thus 
invites us to rethink a host of assumptions in international relations. Firstly, instead of detecting 
signs of “resistance”, we may hypothesize that socializees are motivated by cost minimization 
because of their “cognitive priors” (Acharya 2004: 269). Secondly, local structures and beliefs 
may be used as domestic sources of legitimation for the selective borrowing and modification 
of international norms. Thirdly, localization sets out to analyse the extent to which, and the 
conditions under which, external ideas may be “simultaneously adapted to meet local practices” 
(Acharya 2004: 251). Finally, by shedding light on local practices and political structures, a focus on 
localization processes of international norms uncovers a new investigative area beyond the mere 
assumption that international norms are, or ought to be, internalized.
This local readjustment involves two interrelated dimensions. The first relates to the ability of the 
norm-recipient country to locally readjust the effects and scope of external norms transfers. The 
second pertains to the desire of norm-making countries and institutions to demonstrate that a 
transfer has effectively taken place through incentives, pressure, learning or emulation, even if 
each actor knows that acceptance does not always lead to implementation. Therefore, it is not 
so much a matter of resisting external influences or rules, as of trying to understand why norm-
making countries accept local readjustments. This double-edged effect is illustrated in the next 
chapter with reference to the gradual involvement of some MENA countries in the international 
and European management of borders and migration.
2. MENA COUNTRIES’ PERMEABILITY TO EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
As early as the 2000s, MENA countries were engaged in international talks on migration and 
border controls. This period coincides with the adoption of the International Agenda for Migration 
Management (IAMM), which became, from 2001 onwards, the spearhead of many informal regional 
consultative processes on migration matters.
The IAMM is described as being based on a set of “common understandings” of “shared assumptions 
and principles [between states] underlying migration management” (IOM 2005: 18). However, this 
agenda implies much more than the management of migratory flows.
Beyond their divergent interests, the countries of destination, origin and transit share a common 
objective for managing migration: introducing mechanisms to strengthen their centrality in 
controlling the mobility of their nationals and of foreigners. This agenda brings together and 
structures the roles of each actor, if one considers that it “is the product of individual subjects and, 
once created, provides a context for the further development of their subjectivity” (Dryzek et al. 
1989: 502). Indeed, it constitutes a product of states created for states. This sufficiently explains 
the consensus on which the IAMM has rested.
The 5+5 dialogue initiated in 2002, the dialogue on transit migration in the Mediterranean launched 
in 2003, the 2006 Euro-African Partnership on Migration and Development (or the Rabat Process) 
and the 2008 Paris Process constitute various meetings in which Algeria, Morocco, Libya and 
Tunisia took part. This is not the place to analyse them in detail. The common denominator of these 
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intergovernmental meetings, organized on a regular basis, is their reinforcement of cooperation 
on three main components of the IAMM: firstly, the establishment of mechanisms to guarantee 
the temporary mobility of regular migrant workers and to adapt labour migration to the needs of 
markets in destination countries; secondly, the fight against illegal migration, including enhanced 
cooperation on readmission; and finally, the mobilization of the diaspora for development in the 
countries of origin (IOM 2005), including the need to lower the costs of remittances. At the same 
time, the recurrence of such consultative meetings has not only been aimed at addressing these 
three components. It has also been conducive to the gradual repositioning of states and their law 
enforcement agencies well beyond the realm of migration management matters. The government 
of Tunisia is no exception.
3. MIGRATION MANAGEMENT RE-APPROPRIATED
Playing the efficiency card in border control, and renewing or strengthening strategic alliances 
with major Western powers, have been key factors motivating MENA countries’ involvement in 
the abovementioned regional consultative processes. For example, the managerial centrality of 
the state, which constitutes the cornerstone of the IAMM, has enabled the Tunisian leadership to 
reinforce existing forms of control exercised by the authorities over society in general and over 
Tunisian nationals living abroad. Indeed, the concepts of “management” and “control”, as defined 
in the IAMM, were consistent with the desire of the former regime to discipline any form of dissent, 
both in Tunisia and abroad. The fight against so-called “illegal” migration allowed the regime to 
conceal the real causes of migration from Tunisia and to silence those who had been excluded from 
the Tunisian “economic miracle” (Hibou 1999). The latter were generally described in the media as 
individuals attracted by the dream of the European El Dorado. This paternalistic and infantilizing 
vision, which was repeatedly adopted in Europe, made it possible to divert public attention from 
the real motives driving migrants’ departure, namely underemployment, poverty, social discontent 
and political violence.
The constant reference to European pull factors also served as a rationale for the implementation 
of a system of control and domination over Tunisian society, with the backing of Europe and its 
member states. For example, Tunisian Law 2004-06, dated 3 February 2004, clearly illustrated 
the ambivalent use by the Tunisian authorities of the managerial discourse in the field of 
migration control. Strongly supported by the European Union following the adoption of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the establishment of action plans and a road map, 
this law punished “those who have provided information for, planned, facilitated, assisted, acted 
as intermediary in or organized the smuggling of a person in and out of Tunisian territory by land, 
sea or air, even if no payment was received”.  On the one hand, it reflected the willingness of the 
Tunisian government to tackle the “clandestine exits” of its citizens while responding to European 
calls for enhanced cooperation on the matter. On the other hand, and more ambiguously, its scope 
encompassed not only irregular Tunisian migrants, but also those who remained in the country 
and who would have been aware of clandestine exits without reporting them to the authorities 
(Perrin 2009).
As noted by Hamza Meddeb (2012: 389), by adopting Law 2004-06, the Tunisian authorities “create 
deviance by extending the scope of the law to social categories living on the margins of legality. […] 
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The adoption of this law allows the regime to ensure at low cost its domination and to reinforce its 
authority with fear”.
While it is true that this skilful readjustment of policy transfers from the Europe Union to Tunisia 
existed in other policy areas, such as trade liberalization, economic reforms, the promotion of 
civil society and democratization, the support that Law 2004-06 received from Europe, to the 
detriment of fundamental freedoms, reflected the strength of an image which the regime was 
able to disseminate abroad, especially with reference to the fight against religious extremism and 
international terrorism. As long as it could capitalize on this image, the regime knew that attempts 
to readjust locally policy transfers and practices from abroad would be tolerated by the EU and by 
its member states, either explicitly or tacitly.
Territoriality remains a key explanatory notion of past and current policy developments in North 
African countries. It not only refers to the space where legitimate power and legal rules are applied 
by the state and its law enforcement authorities. It also pertains to an area where state–society 
relationships can be reconfigured, altered, if not reinvigorated to overcome domestic social and 
political divisions.
It could even be argued that claims for territorial integrity in North Africa have been used by the 
sovereign as an asset to embolden its own political and symbolic centrality in a context marked by 
the perceptible retrenchment of the state from the economy, especially when domestic political 
and social tensions loom large.
For example, in Morocco, domestic politics, territoriality, identity and regime stability have become 
closely intertwined to forge a nationalistic sense of unity among “previously hostile forces behind 
the monarchy” (Willis 2014: 272). From the mid-2000s up to the early 2010s, Morocco’s reinforced 
cooperation on border controls and deportation with Spain alienated the country from its traditional 
sub-Saharan African partners (especially Senegal, Mali, Niger and Côte-d’Ivoire). Subsequently, 
the collapse of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi and the declining influence of Libya in sub-Saharan 
Africa opened a new window of opportunity. Morocco reactivated its “African strategy” based on a 
form of soft power which, incidentally, turned out to be consonant with its desire to co-opt some 
sub-Saharan countries with a view to narrowing Algeria’s African playground and to buttressing 
the territorial claims of Morocco on Western Sahara.
Moreover, while the reinforced militarization of Algeria’s borders with Morocco and Libya has 
been presented as an attempt to counter cross-border arms-trafficking and people-smuggling, 
it has invariably been conducive to the centrality of military power in Algeria’s domestic political 
apparatus (the Sulṯa) (Cook 2007) and to opaque foreign alliances with strategic European countries, 
especially France, Belgium and Italy, against jihadist movements encroaching on the whole North 
African region. Border management implies not only a logic of inclusion and exclusion. It also 
engineers a sense of allegiance to the ruling authority (be it a king or a head of government), 
especially when territorial integrity is presented as being threatened.
In a similar vein, the former Tunisian regime of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali was quick to 
understand that appearing to be an efficient player in the field of border management would not 
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only increase its international legitimacy in the West but also reinforce the power of the ruling 
party while concealing mounting social discontent and repression at the domestic level (Cassarino 
2014).
North African states’ involvement in the reinforced control of migration and of their national 
borders has often been tantamount to an attempt to harness domestic territorial, societal and 
political challenges. In this connection, the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed on 2 
February 2017 between Italy and the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by 
Prime Minister Fayez Al-Sarraj is no exception. The MoU has been officially presented as an 
attempt to stem migration flows en route to the EU and to reinforce the control of Libya’s southern 
borders with technological material and financial support from Italy and the EU. That being said, 
one is entitled to view the hasty signature of the MoU as an attempt by the GNA to buttress its 
international legitimacy in the West at a time when Al-Sarraj’s leadership is being increasingly 
challenged domestically. It could even be argued that the quest for international legitimacy and 
military support from the West has been the major driver for the signing of the MoU despite the 
overt reticence of local municipal officials, who are wary of its disruptive implications for the 
country’s deepening civil war (St John 2015).
The above examples demonstrate that reinforced cooperation on migration and border controls 
implies the re-codification of external relations. Moreover, it invariably brings about a reformulation 
of the relations between the parties involved. Today, unprecedented patterns of interconnectedness 
among countries located in the western Mediterranean have consolidated so dramatically that any 
unilateral form of conditionality (be it soft or coercive) must be carefully evaluated lest a whole 
framework of cooperation be jeopardized.  In their bilateral interactions with MENA countries, 
Western countries have learned that conditionalities cannot be equated with pressures when 
it comes to cooperating with empowered “partner” countries, which MENA countries certainly 
are. Using an oxymoron, it is possible to argue that, in recent decades, cooperation on border 
and migration controls has become a central priority in MENA–EU relations. While being central, 
this priority has however remained peripheral to other strategic issue areas including the fight 
against international terrorism and the reinforced control of land and maritime borders. Among 
many others, these are critical priorities on which some North African countries have managed to 
capitalize to varying degrees.
There is no question that the responsiveness of North African countries to the securitization of 
migration policies, including the adoption of legal provisions criminalizing irregular migration 
and border crossing, has been shaped by their respective domestic and regional concerns. Far 
from adopting passively the guidelines and rules transferred from the West, they adaptively 
and selectively transposed them to buttress their own position domestically and internationally. 
Moreover, the perceptible militarization of the region has fed into the criminalization of migration 
policies, just as the criminalization of the “unmanaged” mobility of people (be they citizens or 
foreigners) has fed into the centrality of states and their law enforcement agencies.
To date, the establishment of transgovernmental channels (linking MENA officials from the 
ministries of the Interior and Defence with their European counterparts) has resulted in the 
conclusion of various bilateral security agreements and arrangements and in the provision of 
Middle East and North Africa Regional Architecture: 
Mapping Geopolitical Shifts, Regional Order and Domestic Transformations
8
WORKING PAPERS
No. 13, September 2018
technological and logistical military equipment.  Exchanges of information and technical cooperation 
in the field of identification – for example, using the Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
(AFIS) – constitute key elements. While it is true that identification constitutes a challenge when 
it comes to accelerating the removal of undocumented migrants who are found in an irregular 
situation in Western countries, in MENA countries, as elsewhere (Bigo 2014, Jeandesboz 2016), 
cooperation on identification not only raises a host of legitimate questions about the potential 
use of computerized personal data, it also calls into question the various factors that motivated it 
and justified it. To be sure, transgovernmentalism and its modus operandi contribute to making 
the long-sought reform of MENA countries’ security sectors a daunting challenge, especially in 
Tunisia (Bouguerra 2014, Querine 2016).
CONCLUSION
This study demonstrates that moving the debate beyond the criminalization of international 
migration begins with taking seriously the measure of its cumulative effects on foreigners and 
citizens alike. Such cumulative effects may explain why the drive for criminalization has gained 
so much momentum in all countries of migration, be they rich or poor, democratically organized 
or authoritarian, conflict-ridden or in peace. In short, criminalization is not simply a name for the 
obvious securitization of migration policies, or for how the latter have restricted the movement 
of people across borders. It is a name for a premise that gradually has come to regulate the 
complex relationships between states and their own citizens (be they mobile or not) as well as the 
organization of states’ interactions.
Secondly, we can clearly discern an increasing amount of leverage by MENA states vis-à-vis the EU 
and its member states in the realm of the management of migration in recent years. Significantly, 
this leverage is also expressed in the acquiescence of the EU and the international community at 
large towards the practice of MENA governments to localize European and international norms on 
migration management and to “use” them for their own interests. Most prominently, this includes 
the increasing non-differentiation between “regular” citizens and migrants and the expansion of 
state control over both.
Finally, this study points to the growing embeddedness of the region in the international 
governance of migration, but with a twist: MENA governments are “embedded” in the broader 
trend of criminalizing migration and reinforcing state control, to the general detriment of human 
rights standards.
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by either centrifugal or centripetal dynamics or a combination 
of both? In answering this question, the project is articulated 
around three levels of analysis (domestic, regional and 
global) and outlines future scenarios for 2025 and 2050. Its 
final objective is to provide EU Member States policy makers 
with valuable insights.
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institutions in the field of international relations, identity and 
religion politics, history, political sociology, demography, 
energy, economy, military and environmental studies.
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